had formed a buying group or "split" that would nominate a member to receive exclusive rights to show a first-run film without competitive bidding against other theaters, a scheme in which the film distributors (who were arms of the producers) acquiesced.
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Balmoral Cinema, who was outside the split, sued the distributors and theaters, alleging that the practice was an anticompetitive boycott in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 4 Both groups of defendants insisted that the agreement lawfully enhanced rather than stifled competition by bypassing distributors' pricey licensing auctions and sizeable cash guarantees, which elevated costs to theaters and moviegoers. 5 Likewise did defendants even those exceeding the rental rate the parties would have reached in a voluntary exchange. 14 Nor can an insolvent fiduciary's creditors reach the property, which is said to have been held all along, however fictively, for the victim-principal, never becoming part of the estate of the fiduciary. 15 Fiduciaries operate in Platonic relations within which the weak or naïve party (dubbed "principal" or "beneficiary") is subordinate to the strong or knowing party, who inverts the relation by subordinating him-or herself to the weak party. The strong-party fiduciary takes responsibility for the power/knowledge disparity by, in effect, negating its effects by putting the weak party's interests first.
Identifying fiduciary relationships is done by analogy to the law of trusts. 16 The more a candidate for fiduciary status resembles a trustee, the more likely he or she will be treated like one. The purpose of the analogy is to smooth out conflicts of interest between wealth managers and their clients. Yet this venerable process of arguing by analogy, an essential lawyerly shtick, has allowed for a peculiar extension of fiduciary law. 17 [C]ourts are inconsistent in choosing their analogies. One decision, for example, held that directors are trustees, and applied trust rules against self-dealing to them. But, in order to avoid applying trust law's strict liability for unauthorized unintentional acts to the directors, the court then proceeded to hold that those directors were not trustees.
cause? Another essential lawyerly shtick: the sort of pressure Judge Merritt alluded to above that is placed on law by academic lawyers.
After Part II of this Article sets out the structure of trusts, Part III tests whether the trust analogy makes non-misleading sense within the laws of partnerships, corporations, and agency. Specifically, Part IV demonstrates how academic writing, deploying a sense of "fiduciary" so open as to be empty, has influenced courts to designate franchisors, insurers, and professors as fiduciaries. After Part V posits how this influence has brought about an idiomatic, no-longer technical sense of this essential term of art, I conclude that professors' penchant for pressuring law to change is an activity of uncertain value.
II. Fiduciaries in Trust Relations
The idea of the fiduciary owes to the law of trusts. 18 A trust, in turn, like its historical antecedent -the "use" 19 -is a gift. 20 While ordinary gifts are two-party transfers of real or personal property from donor to donee, trusts involve three parties: the donor (settlor) arranges with the trustee to divide title to the donated property (trust res) between trustee and beneficiary. 21 In trust relations, "fiduciary" describes the trustee, whose divided interest received from the settlor is "legal" title to the res, which the settlor directs the trustee-fiduciary to manage for the enjoyment of the settlor's beneficiary. 22 The beneficiary's divided interest received from the settlor is "equitable" title to the trust property, which, according to the trust's terms, will eventually reunite the divided legal and equitable title interests to the beneficiary's sole advantage. 23 The trust developed at the end of the Middle Ages, when real estate was the principal form of wealth. The primary purpose of the trust was to facilitate the transfer of freehold land within the family. 24 The trust allowed landowners "'to make decent provision for their wives, daughters and younger sons and to prevent escheat'" while avoiding other vestiges of bizarre feudal restrictions. 25 Trustees early on were mere stakeholders with no serious powers or responsibilities of management. Commonly, the beneficiaries lived on and managed the land.
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In an era (fourteenth to seventeenth centuries) when property was less alienable than now, the trust, apart from facilitating conveyances within families, was a way to get around the ban on unmarried adults, clerics, Christians, foreigners, criminals, and slaves owning property. 27 Trusts let property owners arrange for the enjoyment of property by these banned classes by passing legal title to a trustee who held for the equitable owner, a member of the banned class. This divergence reflects developments in corporate law, where judicial supervision of fiduciaries has backed off from traditional fiduciary-law rhetoric. 60 In particular, under RUPA, partners may re-bargain their agreement on the fly, lend money to the partnership, purchase its assets, or obtain waivers of fiduciary duties for specific purposes. 61 By codifying the permissible pursuit of self-interest, RUPA acknowledges that sweeping statements of fiduciary duties invite costly litigation and threats of litigation, including by partners who seek to avoid some aspect of their partnership agreement. 62 As the reporter for RUPA has summarized: "The partner is no longer a trustee." 
B. Corporations
Like the partnerships of the sixteenth century, the predecessors of the modern corporation -the joint stock companies or overseas trading companies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries -imported fiduciary law 65 to tighten up what were seen as weak constraints placed by contract law on the self-dealing temptations of those at the helm. 66 To this day, "fiduciarians" continue to defend that move against "contractarians," who find fiduciary law a drag on the rough and tumble advantage-taking permitted by contract law, which, contractarians insist, can competently regulate conflicts on its own. 67 Yet mapping fiduciary law onto corporate law is far from light work, given that the legal nature of corporations -what they are, who owns them, whom they should benefit -is a fog. 68 Still, as a way of talking about corporate ownership, 69 the trust analogy works well enough for locating shareholders in the role of beneficiary or equitable-title holder. But the analogy weakens when attempting to locate boards of directors and corporate managers in the role of trustee or legal-title holder, which they occupy in only the most etiolated sense. 70 identity apart from those individuals and relations. 71 Under that "aggregate" or "property" the intention being to reduce the temptations of employees, who hold their employers' good will and wealth over the barrel. 148 By handling key functions and cash to boot, 149 employees might steal or at a minimum withhold "their best efforts to produce, innovate, cooperate with management, or share information." 150 No wonder, the story goes, employers spy on their employees. 151 From an employee perspective, however, they are the ones over the barrel:
I can think of no relationship in which one party, the employee, places more reliance upon the other, is more dependent upon the other, or is more vulnerable to abuse by the other, than the relationship between employer and employee. And, ironically, the relative imbalance of economic power between employer and employee tends to increase rather than diminish the longer that relationship continues. Whatever bargaining strength and marketability the employee may have at the moment of hiring, diminishes rapidly thereafter. Marketplace? What market is there for the factory worker laid off after 25 years of labor in the same plant, or for the middle-aged executive fired after 25 years with the same firm?
employer-fiduciary, 154 despite some push from academics to expand. 155 Realistically, neither side could be expected to renounce self-interest, given "the inherently antagonistic character of the traditional employer-employee relationship." 156 If there were any question about this, check out final-offer arbitration in major league baseball, where
[t]eams risk injuring their relationship with a player by arguing that his worth is well below what the player thinks he is worth. A team might be forced to defend its proposal by "insulting a player and presenting arguments that harp on a player's physical or mental defects, or demeaning his past contributions to the club, playing record or public appeal."
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Who is the other-regarding, supererogatory fiduciary there? At work, in markets, in capitalism, we are all over the barrel, though not all of us are fiduciaries.
IV. Academic Influence on Fiduciary Law
There is a nontrivial cost to decoupling fiduciary law from trusts or trust-like person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan," and thus subject to ERISA fiduciary duties, "to the extent" he or she "exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of [plan] assets….") (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A))(internal quotation marks omitted). 155 I have a friend who is fond of defining 'fiduciary' as follows: "Fiduciary" is what the judge calls you before ruling against you. And I think we see a lot of those sort of complex connotations of the term, which could make it problematic as used in black-letter text. 160 Indeed, the term has become so extended that no longer is it a stretch to say that fiduciary duties emerge whenever -with or without anything resembling a trust res -one party has a broad grant of discretion over the other's interests amidst a dependency relation due to information asymmetry. 161 If all agents are fiduciaries, then who else among powerwielders might we add to the list? Indeed, to call the franchise relation "fiduciary" overshoots the intentionally incomplete contractual terms the parties have sketched out, whereby ownership resides in the franchisee (who operates much like an independent contractor) and control resides in the franchisor (who operates much like an employer). Thus throwing around the word "fiduciary" as a way of characterizing franchisors' obligations to franchisees completely gives up on assessing the complexity of the relation, its long-term nature, the give and take, and mostly, the reality that in the commercial world, we are all subject to others, none of us wholly subservient nor powerful, a reality that "fiduciary" as label obscures. compensatory damages in favor of a plaintiff whose insurer refused to pay losses from a foot injury incurred when he fell into a working washing machine. 179 According to California's high court, because the insurer's unjustifiable attempt to avoid the policy breached "its duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every policy," the $75,000 compensatory award would stand. 180 But the trial court had vacated the jury's $500,000
punitive-damages award due to insufficient proof of scienter, an element of just punishment. 181 Goodman and Seaton lobbied the high court to reinstate the punitive damages award:
It was in failing to meet its fiduciary obligations that the insurer in Silberg exposed itself to compensatory and even punitive damages. The company was aware of Silberg's predicament; its behavior during his financial, physical, and mental collapse can only be described as grossly insensitive, displaying a lack of humanity that should have insulted not only the plaintiff and jurors but California Life's competitors as well. Its actions were the direct result of its misconception of its proper loyalties. The Silberg opinion, hopefully, will leave insurers with no doubt that with great power goes great responsibility.
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Just what the word "fiduciary" was meant here to add to an insurer's good-faith obligations the authors did not elaborate. When the trial court's ruling vacating the punitive-damages award was affirmed, nowhere in Justice Mosk's twelve-page opinion for the court did the word "fiduciary" appear. [A]s a supplier of a public service rather than a manufactured product, the obligations of insurers go beyond meeting reasonable expectations of coverage. The obligations of good faith and fair dealing encompass qualities of decency and humanity inherent in the responsibilities of a fiduciary. Insurers hold themselves out as fiduciaries, and with the public's trust must go private responsibility consonant with that trust. 185 From this dictum on a principle of insurance contracts began a series of judicial faux pas.
Specifically, while admitting that Egan did not exactly rule on the matter, yet finding "little room for doubt" that insurers are fiduciaries of their insureds, one court of appeal was content "assuming" as much. 186 Soon after, another, while finding "no support in case law, other than dicta in a few Supreme Court cases," found insurers "akin to" but not quite fiduciaries, leaving room for insurers' pursuit of self-interest. 187 Six weeks later, Judge Keep, sitting in diversity, summarized California law on the "difficult question" of whether insurers are fiduciaries. 188 Delineating the difference between the thing itself (a fiduciary relation) and the "seeming trend" toward something similar ("fiduciary-like responsibilities"), 189 she concluded that an "insurer is not required to put the insured's interest before its own." 190 With social, domestic, or purely personal relations implicating "critical resources," parents, too, are held out as fiduciaries, not just when parents divert their child's earnings to themselves, 234 but in cases of child abuse as well. 235 The same is said of married couples, not just in the disposition of marital property, but also where one aggresses against the other's "critical resources." In this vein is it unsurprising that clergy-abuse cases are characterized as breaches of fiduciary duties to protect the physical integrity, not just property, of servient parties. 236 This path of the law strikes me as eccentric. Suppose, for example, an attorney (the "quintessential fiduciary") impulsively settles a quarrel with a client by punching him in the face. Should the client bring an action for breach of fiduciary duty? Can "fiduciary" really be so cut off from its grammar, so beyond "Beyond Metaphor" 237 and into an idiomatic usage that trades on the criteria of fiduciary (selflessness, antiopportunism, protection of the weak) while at once denying those criteria (a trust res to conserve or grow)?
"Fiduciary" in this idiomatic sense is a movement in academic literature, where the term now is deployed as a way of getting across an ideal -that opportunism is bad, that other-regarding behavior is good. 238 Indeed, some scholars seem to mean nothing at all by it, one even using "fiduciary" in the title and then again for the first time in the conclusion of a fifty-three page tract.
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These fiduciary-isms, these bendings over backwards to expand the law, have succeeded to a point in that some have prevailed in court rulings rendered by judges who are open to academic commentary. This is no mean feat, given that scholarship about scholarship, of which there is much, 240 agrees that judges cite professors infrequently. 241 Even when they do, the cites count for little, 242 only really mattering about 18% of the time. 243 With the exception of "a few transformative scholarly works" (e.g., Kathleen disappointment, 247 write mainly for each other. 248 Heavy hitters like Catherine MacKinnon, Laurence Tribe, and Anthony Amsterdam (among others) 249 are consequently seen as outliers: unrepresentative of the group. 250 The reasons for the irrelevance of scholarly efforts are familiar. 251 Prominent among content-related reasons is the contempt with which high-falutin' academic lawyers hold doctrine, including precedent, which they get paid to transcend. 252 It's hard to put a positive spin on the fact that only seven percent of judges regularly read law reviews. 253 But spin we do. Law professors "influence how judges decide cases," 254 even when uncited, 255 if only by informing "the processes, individuals, and institutions that create the
